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Abstract  
The systems development, procurement and sustainment of a nation’s military equipment is vital to its national interests, but the 
process is complex, constantly changing and highly adaptive, as well as time consuming and costly.  The U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) expends both large amounts of capital and manpower to equip its armed forces.  This research seeks to identify 
opportunities to gain better insight into the functioning of the defense acquisition system, building on previous simulations.   A 
case is made that the DoD Requirements, Planning Acquisition, Technology and Logistics System is a complex adaptive system 
that has characteristics appropriate for exploration with agent-based modeling.  This paper reviews relevant literature, existing 
models and presents preliminary analysis on an agent-based simulation of the DoD acquisition system.  This research finds that 
agent-based modeling can provide insights to inform new acquisition theory. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper considers simulation of the U.S. system for identifying, funding, developing and fielding military 
weapon systems.  Despite its obvious success in producing superior combat power, the system has been plagued for 
decades by cost and schedule overruns and, at times, performance shortcomings.1, 2  Dozens of major reform efforts, 
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and hundreds of organizational guidelines, policy and process changes, aimed at controlling overruns, have been 
proposed or implemented over the past six decades.  Unfortunately, the changes made only marginal improvements.1-
10  Many experts continue to question why reforms were not more effective and what changes really should be made.9  
A 2011 report by one government panel claimed the existence of over three hundred reports and studies written on 
acquisition reform since the mid 1980’s alone.11  Despite the large number of government reports and studies, there 
remains a lack of scholarly research on the theoretical underpinnings of the system.12, 13  This paper postulates that 
considering the complexity of the system will lend some new insights to inform military procurement theory.  
Developments in Systems Theory and Complexity Science may provide a useful set of tools to build a framework for 
characterizing the system as a whole and the relationship to its parts.  This paper introduces a research methodology 
for examining the U.S. weapon procurement system as a complex adaptive system (CAS) and using agent-based 
modeling (ABM) to identify significant causal factors that contribute to the performance of the procurement system. 
The U.S. weapon procurement system is an interesting subject of study for a number of reasons not least of which 
is the complexity due to its size and scope.  U.S. military Research, Development, Testing and Engineering (RDT&E), 
Procurement, and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) consumed an average outlay of about $330 billion per year in 
FY 2015 constant year dollars from 1962 to 2014.14  Figure 1 is a graph of these outlays during that period.  In addition, 
according to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as of the first quarter of 2014, the Defense Acquisition System 
directly employs over 135,000 government civilians and about 16,000 military members.15  Defense contractors can 
employ a far greater number of people across the nation.16 
 
 
Figure 1.   $Billions (FY 2015 Constant) in Defense Department Outlays. Data source is FY15 Green Book Table 6-11 14 
The U.S. weapon procurement system can be thought of as a “meta-organization”17, 18 formed by the integration of 
several autonomous and semi-autonomous organizations.  To begin with, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) uses 
three separately led “decision-making support systems” to identify requirements, plan, budget, develop, acquire, test 
and field weapon systems.  The three systems are the Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS), 
Planning Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) system and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS).19   
  
Figure 2.   Three decision systems are used to acquire US Defense weapon systems. 
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Taken together these three systems are known as Big “A” where “A” stands for acquisition.20  See Figure 2.  It is 
called Big “A” to distinguish the aggregate from one of the component systems, the DAS which is sometimes referred 
to as little “a”.  The Big “A” interfaces with two other organizations: the U.S. Congress, and a number of defense 
contractors to form an even more complex interconnected “meta-organization” which ultimately designs, produces 
and maintains equipment for U.S. military forces as described in Table 1.  For the purpose of this paper, this entire 
meta-organizational system is referred as the “U.S. military procurement system” or simply “the system”.  The 
complexity of the system frustrates predictive analysis and reform efforts. 
Table 1: Participating organizations in the U.S. military procurement meta-organization  
Participating Organization Acquisition Function Leader / Decision Maker 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution 
System (PPBES) 
Plan, program and determine 
resources  
DoD Comptroller 
Joint Capabilities and Development System (JCIDS) Identify capability gaps that translate 
to weapon system requirements 
U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Defense Acquisition System (DAS), known as Little “a” Develop, acquire, test and field 
weapon systems 
Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Technology and Logistics 
Congress  Legislative oversight and 
appropriations 
U.S. House and Senate Armed Services 
Committee Chairmen and members  
  U.S. House and Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittees on Defense, Chairmen and 
members 
Office of the Secretary of Defense Execute defense policy Secretary of Defense 
Defense Contractors, Integrators, Suppliers Produce systems, make profit Business Leaders 
Warfighters Use/ operate systems Combatant Commanders 
 
Agent-based modeling is particularly well suited for developing and testing theory about the complex behavior of 
the meta-organization described above.  The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, a literature review 
identifies authoritative references describing the defense acquisition system, its problems, attempts at solutions, 
applicable complex adaptive systems theory and an overview of some existing simulations.  Research questions are 
posed, potential agents and potential factors affecting the system are proposed as candidates for initial simulation 
studies. 
2. Review of Literature 
It should be clear that a better understanding of the behavior and dynamics of the military procurement system is 
essential for efficient and effective program management and systems engineering efforts for the DoD.  Wilson, a 
political scientist, studied government agencies from “the bottom up”, vice top down in his book, Bureaucracy: What 
government agencies do and why they do it.21  He writes “by looking at bureaucracies from the bottom up, we can 
assess the extent to which their management systems and administrative arrangements are well or poorly suited to the 
tasks the agencies actually perform”.  Wilson traces the failures of some government reorganizations to a lack of 
understanding by the architects about what the employees actually do.  Sources were obtained beginning with recent 
government reports on ongoing reform efforts, foundational literature on the utility of complexity science and agent-
based modeling and finally existing research on simulations of the U.S. weapon procurement system.  The search 
included a review of secondary sources which inform and influence current reform trends.  Some prominent sources 
of information and analysis on the system are produced by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD AT&L), Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Acquisition Research Program, the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), Congressional Research Service (CRS) and industry groups such as the National Defense Industrial 
Association (NDIA) as well as academic literature from several domains.   
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Fox describes the following characteristics of the military procurement system: “price is usually not an overriding 
factor; product and quantity are determined, not by the management of the firm, but by governmental authority; and 
competition normally focuses on proposed design rather than the physical product, and on promises of performance 
rather than the performance itself…the supplier often holds a monopoly and the purchaser holds a monopsony (i.e., 
one buyer only).”7  Many authors list similar characteristics to demonstrate difference between the military 
procurement system and typical commercial markets upon which many economic theories are based.7, 22, 23  
McNaugher noted three separate “dimensions” to the procurement system: technical, military and political that can 
each possess “divergent needs”.24  These descriptions highlight the unique nature of the military procurement system 
and provide some clues about why theories from other fields can fail to anticipate important behaviors of this system.  
The review suggests that aspects of the military procurement system may yield to some amalgamation of business 
management theory, organizational science, political science, public administration theory, economic theory, military 
theory, systems theory, system engineering, architecting, operations research and perhaps theory from other fields.  In 
fact, Shafer and Snider recently proposed that the lack of theory on the behavior of the U.S. military procurement 
system is due in part to the interdisciplinary nature of the problem.12 
2.1. U.S. Military Procurement System Issues and Recommendations 
There are a few highly visible issues with the military procurement system discussed in the literature.  The first is 
the high average cost and schedule growth from initial estimates along with instances of dramatic cost and schedule 
growth on specific programs.1, 2  As of March 2014, GAO reports that the current portfolio of 80 major defense 
programs has a current estimated total cost of $1.5 trillion which includes a current total cost growth of $448 billion.25  
The GAO also reports an average program delay of 28 months for all active programs.  Another reason for heightened 
interest by policy makers and other interested parties are the prevalence of large program cancellations.  In 2011, the 
Defense Business Board, an advisory body under the Office of the Secretary of Defense reported that from 2001 to 
2011, the DoD cancelled programs worth over $50 billion without taking substantial deliveries.11  The OUSD AT&L 
released an annual performance report in 2013 which reported that over $1 billion per year in the period between 1996 
and 2010 was spent on terminated Army programs alone.   A third recurring issue is lower than expected technical 
performance of some systems.  Some criticisms of performance can be subjective.26  However, empirical data on the 
performance of weapon systems was provided in the 2013 report on the performance of the DAS.  According to the 
report, 30% of the 181 major defense programs evaluated by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation 
(DOT&E) between1984-2011 were not deemed operationally suitable, and 11% were not deemed operationally 
effective.1  A fourth important issue are some cases of real and perceived fraud and abuse which can erode public 
trust.  This issue was prominent in the Packard Commission’s 1986 report to the President on reform findings and 
recommendations.27  In summary, the top issues with the military procurement system were found to be: 1) program 
schedule and cost growth, 2) waste (through cancellations) and 3) poor performance and 4) real and perceived abuses. 
The solutions to these issues are not straightforward.  There is uncertainty reflected in the literature regarding 
causation and remedies.  Table 2 summarizes some common recommendations for procurement system 
changes/reforms found in the literature.  The recommendations are grouped under categories of potential causal factors 
representing similar controls.  Proponents believe these factors to effect some aspect of program cost, schedule and 
performance.  Many of the factors in Table 2 have been proposed repeatedly over several decades and many were 
attempted during the various reforms since the 1950s.  The similarity of the recommendations across time indicate 
that authors may be basing their recommendations on similar theories.  The lackluster results of the reforms mentioned 
in the introduction call into question the recommendations along with their theoretical basis.  In fact, there are some 
examples of frequently cited causal factors which upon closer inspection cannot be linked to the system performance 
using empirical methods.  One such factor is the lack of program management "tenure" – the time a program manager 
remains in their role before reassignment.6, 7, 28  Despite the widespread belief, recent analyses found no significant 
correlation between program management tenure and programmatic outcomes.1, 2, 29  Other work suggests that there 
is a lack of commonly held theory.  In 1990 Burgess and Clark conducted 39 interviews of senior officials and found 
substantial differences of opinion and a lack of agreement on the structure of the system.  They also highlight the need 
for theoretical work in Big “A" acquisition processes and organizations, as recently proposed by Shaffer and Snider.12    
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Table 2. A Summary and Categorization of Recommendations from Literature 
Possible Causal Factor Recommendations from Literature 
Incentives 7, 17, 30 Use incentive fee contracts9 
Require PM to serve after major milestones9 
Revise perverse incentives like pulling funding based on spending rate, program awards based on cost9, 31, 32 
Use independent cost estimates 25, 33 
Create incentives for Commanders and PMs to drive individual efficiency efforts31 
Use competition or competitive forces34 
Organizational/ 
Structural 
Centralize control of system (Joint and OSD control or integrate services’ acquisitions under OSD)9, 27 
Decentralize control of system5 
Manage programs as “Portfolios”27, 35 
“Zero-base” acquisitions (wholesale redesign, transformation/reengineering)11, 13, 36 
Establish “clear chain of command” 27, 37 
Workforce Education/ 
Experience 
Prepare program managers and other acquisition personnel with skills and experience6, 7, 38 
Professionalize the acquisition career fields11, 27 
Cross flow program managers into operations and vice versa11 
Program managers should have experience with program management7, 29 
Rules/Norms/ Policy Revise “harmonize” and eliminate law, regulation and rules in phases in partnership with stakeholders9, or 
quickly remove all or most rules11, 27 
 Forbid “excessive concurrency” 25 
Require Services to estimate and consider lifecycle affordability before program start27, 28 
Require higher program manager tenure27, 37 
Use evolutionary acquisition model as opposed to revolutionary25, 28, 36, 36 
Prototype25, 27 
Freeze requirements early in the process11, 25 
Reduce number of decision reviews5, 11, 27 
 
2.2. Complex Adaptive Systems 
Holland says Complex Adaptive Systems: “are systems that have large numbers of components, often called agents, 
that interact and adapt or learn."39  Gell-Mann uses a similar definition.40  The individuals and organizations that make 
up the Contractors, the Program Office, PPBE, JCIDS, Congress, and threats may be considered as interacting agents 
and meta-agents.  If a system is complex, Lewin41 suggests the following characteristics should be expected:  
x sensitivity to initial conditions,  
x emergent behaviors,  
x composition of components,  
x uncertain boundaries,  
x nesting,  
x state memory,  
x non-linear relationships, and feedback loops. 
These properties can make predictive analysis difficult or impossible using analytical methods so researchers often 
turn to simulation. 
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Authors in many fields are finding varied uses for complexity science.  Examples of CAS identified in the literature 
include healthcare systems42, and supply chains43 among others.  Military theorists note complexity arising from the 
demand for increased interagency cooperation by the U.S. military and U.S. and Coalition governments, in response 
to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the international terrorist threat.  Common among the literature on the 
“interagency” problem is a lack of central control.44-46  Reed considers the entire U.S. Department of Defense a 
complex system and found that participants’ activities can cause unpredictable outcomes.47  Complexity is not 
confined to social systems.  Today’s system engineers and system architects are engineering and analyzing “Systems 
of Systems” (SoS) which arise from interconnected, independent component systems.  Maier found three types of 
SoS: Directed, Collaborative and Virtual (listed in the order of increasing independence of their component systems).48  
He warns architects that misclassifying a System of Systems as “directed” vice “collaborative” can lead to systems 
which depend on unreliable cooperation across boundaries.  The problem of anticipating and shaping the behavior of 
a loosely coupled group of autonomous or semi-autonomous entities has an increasing number of applications across 
technology, business, government and society in general.  In answer to Shaffer and Snider12, one academic field that 
accounts for the interdisciplinary nature of the military procurement system is the study of complex adaptive systems.       
 
2.3. Existing Models and Simulations 
This section describes three existing dynamic simulations of the entire U.S. military procurement system.  The 
review omits static process modeling such as the Acquisition Process Model49 or The Integrated Defense Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics Life Cycle Management System Chart50 due to space limitation.  The review also omits 
some existing dynamic simulations that focus only on parts of the system.   
Work by Burgess and Clark beginning in the mid 1980’s culminating in the early 1990’s appears to be the first 
published attempts at formulating a dynamic simulation of the entire U.S. military procurement system.17, 51, 52  Their 
research utilized a model of the Defense Acquisition System created under the System Dynamics paradigm.  The 
simulation purpose was to assess policy changes.52 Burgess and Clark also introduce the term meta-organizational 
system which is “several independent organizations working toward a common set of objectives.”   The participating 
“organizations may or may not have competing goals as well as their common objectives.”17  Interestingly, complex 
organizational structures like this appear to be becoming more common over time.  Gulati observed similar behavior 
in business organizations and coined the same term using a very similar definition in 2012.18  The idea that the defense 
acquisition system is a meta-organization is a key insight because just as Maier notes with Systems of Systems, this 
loosely coupled structure seems to impart otherwise unexplainable dynamics.  Burgess and Clark classify the Defense 
Acquisition System as a meta-organizational system with various independent sectors.  In their System Dynamics 
model, the sectors are called: Defense, Industry, Threat and National.  Burgess and Clark suggest that study of meta-
organizations will require a different theoretical framework than traditional organizations.   
A second set of system level simulations and mathematical models of the military procurement system is presented 
in work by Pennock36, Pennock, Rouse and Kollar13 and Bodner, Smith and Rouse.53  This set of research uses a 
variety of modeling methods such as stochastic models, game theory, dynamic programming, economic valuation 
models and discrete event simulation to represent various aspects of the military procurement system.  Pennock 
presents a stochastic model of a weapon program with multiple rational stakeholders who place non-cooperative 
technology demands on the program.36  The model’s resulting stable technology policy is one that utilizes immature 
technology.  This model helps to explain the prevalence of immature technology observed in programs by GAO and 
others despite the fact that it is contrary to official DoD policy.  Pennock also presents a discrete event simulation of 
the defense acquisition system which is used to assess evolutionary acquisition policies.  The results show that 
evolutionary acquisition should increase weapon system performance however, it does not reduce cost unless overhead 
can be significantly reduced.  Bodner, Smith and Rouse use a version of this discrete event simulation in a 2009 report 
to determine the effect of weapon system modularity policies on the performance of the military procurement system.53 
Other research by Pennock, Rouse and Kollar recommends a methodology to assign economic value to different 
procurement system reform projects based on phased reforms with real options to proceed.36  Their study found that 
in some cases relatively small process improvement projects can produce dramatic increases in buying power. 
In 2009, Wirthlin developed the Enterprise Requirements and Acquisition Model (ERAM) simulation to identify 
enterprise leverage points in defense acquisition program performance.35 Data about the events and products were 
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gathered through analysis of existing policy and guidance, as well as numerous interviews with defense acquisition 
experts, which provided face validity. The events and products were those required for a typical aerospace defense 
program throughout the lifecycle, with emphasis placed on activities and events prior to Milestone C.  Because the 
DoD acquisition process entails great complexity and has lots of stochastic processing times, discrete event system 
simulation is one appropriate analysis methodology for improving the current system.   Tasks within JCIDS, DAS, 
PPBES and the defense contractors are characterized by triangular probability density functions representing task 
time.  Decision logic is characterized by the probability of occurrence for each type of decision.  The overall schedule 
(time in months) for simulated programs are collected and analyzed with various interventions in the process.  
 
2.4. Agent-Based Modeling 
Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) is a modeling paradigm that has proven useful in describing complex systems.54-56  
ABM is gaining greater popularity due to availability of large datasets and increased computing power.54, 57  Bonabeau 
says “an agent-based model consists of a system of agents and the relationships between them.”  He uses the term 
“microscopic modeling” to distinguish ABM from “macroscopic modeling” techniques like differential equation 
models.  Bonabeau enumerates three benefits of ABM over other modeling techniques: “1) ABM captures emergent 
phenomena; 2) ABM provides a natural description of a system; and 3) ABM is flexible”.  Carley summarizes 
organizational design possibilities using agent-based modeling techniques.58  North and Macal offer extensive 
practical advice on many aspects of ABM design such as construction, verification and validation.55  Borshchev and 
Filippov describe how to translate a discrete event simulation or a system dynamics simulation into an agent-based 
model.59  Rahmandad and Sterman explore the effect of network heterogeneity on differential equation models and 
corresponding agent-based models that employ various agent interaction network configurations.57  They find that 
network heterogeneity is more easily accounted for using an agent-based approach and that network configurations 
can cause significant differences in model output.  Macal extends both the Borshchev and Flippov and the Rahmandad 
and Sterman research by offering a generic transformation from a class of System Dynamics models to equivalent 
agent-based models.60  Future research with agent-based modeling may be able to use similar techniques to capitalize 
on the existing system level simulations of the military procurement system that are based on discrete event and system 
dynamics paradigms.   
  
3. Preliminary Modeling Considerations 
The literature suggests that ABM is an appropriate tool for characterizing the military procurement system. An 
agent-based simulation will allow us to examine system limitations, estimate baseline performance, assess tradeoffs 
and hopefully architect better arrangements.  Agent-based simulation of the system should provide additional insight 
not available through analytical, system dynamics or discrete event methods.  ABM allows for heterogeneity in the 
stakeholders in the system.  Each class of stakeholder may derive value from separate aspects of a program.  In 
addition, ABM can more easily account for the many situations where programs in development deviate from the 
standard process.  The ABM can also model the network effects arising from interactions between weapons programs 
or between the various organizations involved.  This section presents our initial work on specifying model 
components.   
 
3.1. Desired Outputs 
An ABM architecture will produce outputs useful to make choices between different system configurations.  Cost, 
schedule and performance for products of the acquisition system are the primary performance measures of interest.  
Depending on the focus of the study, some additional outputs will be reaction time of alternate systems to crisis events, 
relative technical superiority and measures of efficiency.  The model should produce performance metrics for an ideal 
system along with a representation of the current system and interventions.  The performance metrics can be used to 
establish a baseline to measure performance against and inform us on some system limitations.  
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3.2. Agent Candidates and Selection 
Initial models will use a simplified subset of the multitude of agent types in the real system.  The research team 
utilized available reports on the acquisition system along with simplifying assumptions to choose a number of agents 
for a preliminary model.  Programs are modeled as meta agents which represent the program manager and staff.  Other 
necessary meta agents are decision making entities from other organizations in Table 1 such as congressional members 
and their staff, JCIDS (Joint Staff) organizations, PPBES (financial management) agents, Defense contractors, user 
agents along with perhaps threat agents.  All of these interacting meta-agents begin to establish an inherent structure, 
which could be examined; a notional graph is shown in Figure 3.  Nodes of various types represent agents.  The three 
decision making support systems from Figure 2 are shown consisting of a variety of heterogeneous nodes.  Icons of 
airplanes, tanks satellites etc representing major defense acquisition programs are shown in the DAS group.  Around 
each of the program icons, are six nodes representing standard leadership positions in each program office.  The large 
yellow geometric shapes (square, circle, triangle) are the three distinct leaders of the three decision making support 
functions listed in Table 1.  Subordinate agents in each decision making support function are shown as smaller agents 
with corresponding geometric shapes.  The five largest prime contractors are represented by the group of large grey 
circular nodes labeled “Industry”.  Blue and Red nodes representing members of congressional committees in two 
houses of congress are shown in the group labeled “Congress”.  Major functions supported by each agent group are 
represented by icons such as, dollar signs for programming and budgeting, lightbulbs for concept generation and 
parchment for laws and regulation.  Agents in the notional model are linked by way of communication or command 
channels.  The bolded red links represent DoD level coordination between the leads of the three decision making 
support systems.  The nodes and links between subordinate members of the decision making support systems overlap 
representing the interactions required between the three systems.  This figure is intended to highlight the heterogeneity 
and interconnectedness of actors in the military procurement system and to illustrate the application of an agent 
approach to modeling it.  Publicly available information and data from previous studies provide a framework to 
populate the notional model.  This construct will allow future work in refining models of these meta-agents with 
additional data as it becomes available.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Notional structure of agents interacting across the entire military procurement meta-organizational system 
 
 
 
391 Karl Schwenn et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  44 ( 2015 )  383 – 392 
3.3. Early Modeling 
The team constructed a number of preliminary agent-based models of aspects of the military procurement system 
based on the agent types shown in Figure 3.  The early efforts have focused on building a model framework using 
NetLogo62 which can be modified to allow future designed experiments.  The experimental phase will include 
embellishments designed to assess the influence of factors such as those found Table 2 or other “factors the 
Department can actually affect (policies, contract terms, incentives, workforce skills, etc.)”.1  The preliminary efforts 
increased the team’s confidence in the utility of the ABM approach for modeling this system.  The preliminary agent 
simulations easily run on desktop computers.  These models utilize hundreds of meta-agents with simple if-then 
behavior rules.  Models of a much larger scale are possible.  Examples of models with millions of agents can be found 
in the literature.  Several challenges of the agent approach are: lack of existing valid models of agent behavior as well 
as difficulty in data collection and parameterization of the model.  Construction of a valid and useful agent-based 
model of this system will be iterative and phased.   
4. Concluding Remarks 
The literature review revealed a lack of dramatic performance improvements in the system after years of reforms.  
One reason might be misunderstandings and false assumptions about how the system behaves.   Additionally, there is 
no practical way to test alternative structures and policies on the system to gain insight into effectiveness before 
implementation.  Modeling and simulation shows promise in cases like this where experimenting is impractical or 
expensive.  Several researchers have modeled various aspects or the whole of the military procurement system.  Yet 
none so far have explicitly recognized it to be a complex adaptive system and taken an agent approach.  Previous 
system level simulations are based on system dynamics17, discrete event13, 35 and business process modeling49 
paradigms.  There are also a small number of mathematical descriptions of some of the dynamics.36  Agent-based 
modeling is a useful tool in the study of complex adaptive systems and taking and agent perspective should provide 
new insights into the complex interactions between component programs, organizations and other agents in the 
military procurement system.  Dynamic simulation studies can help formulate theory and demonstrate likely outcomes 
of several proposed strategies.  The paper sought to excite researchers to provide further system characterization and 
to continue to build an academic body of knowledge on the functioning of this system through simulation. 
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